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Abstract 
This chapter addresses the question, Has the methodology of cross-modal transfer 
effected our theory of cognition and blindness to the detriment of the majority of people with 
visual impairments? In order to address this question, philosophical and psychological 
literature in the date range 1688–2008 is surveyed, and methodologies are analysed using an 
epistemological model of blindness. It is concluded that methodologies used in the study of 
cross-modal transfer rarely developed a useful epistemology of blindness, or promoted the 
social inclusion of people with visual impairments. Instead, studies often conflated moral 
philosophy, intellect and perception for political and religious motives. Two possible solutions 
to these problems are suggested: firstly, methodology in the study of philosophy and 
psychology needs to accommodate a spectrum of variables effecting visual impairment; 
secondly, philosophers and psychologists need to do more to promote the inclusion and 
understanding of blindness itself, rather than trying to make broad points about the mind and 
deficit. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter surveys classical philosophies on blindness and cross-modal transfer, and 
how these philosophies’ methods have affected our understanding of visual impairment. The 
study is designed to help the reader understand why we think sense data from low or no 
vision can only be enhanced or substituted through touch. The survey’s discussion is 
necessary for those working with people who are visually impaired, to understand the 
epistemology of learning theory and visual impairment in practice. 
This chapter is written with professionals, researchers and students of education and 
related fields in mind – either those developing informal education in social settings such as 
museums or workplaces, or formal education through institutions such as schools, colleges, 
or universities. Although this survey is far from the complete story of understanding cognition 
and blindness, it is a foundation on which future research on blindness and learning can be 
designed. 
Importantly, in this chapter I develop an argument from a previous study, which 
examined the philosophical influences on English schools for the blind (Hayhoe, 2015), to ask 
the question: Has the methodology of cross-modal transfer effected our theory of cognition 
and blindness to the detriment of the majority of people with visual impairments? 
In this chapter, I discuss this question in relation to two approximate academic periods 
of philosophy: the first spanning the century following 1688, the second spanning the half 
century following 1950. In discussing this question, I argue philosophies on blindness have 
un-naturally divided people into two artificial categories: the sighted and the sightless. 
Furthermore, I argue these categories have become connected in ways that are unrelated to 
eyesight and the social needs of people with visual impairments. 
I call this epistemological process of categorisation passive exclusion, and this 
historical development of philosophies an epistemological model of examining blindness –in 
my discussion, I shorten this latter long title to the epistemological model of blindness for 
brevity. In this chapter, I focus on epistemology as a tool to study knowledge development, 
with a specific emphasis on its social, historical and cultural influences. 
The epistemological model of blindness is largely inspired by two sources of literature. 
The first source is centred on an understanding that the natural sciences are premised on the 
existence of evolution in the traditional sense. It also examines the philosophical belief in a 
pre-determined natural order, in which impairments such as blindness exist. The modern 
source inspiring this refinement is Nagel’s (2012) theory that: 
the mind-body problem is not just a local problem, having to do with the relation 
between mind, brain and behaviour in living animal organisms, but that it invades our 
understanding of the entire cosmos and its history. (Nagel, 2012:P.3) 
Consequently, I argue we have tried too hard to classify blindness through a 
reductionist, unified theory of material philosophy. In doing so, we have over-simplified 
multifaceted impairments and social categories of impairment, and illogically conflated visual 
and aesthetic beliefs to construct a visual disability. 
My second source of inspiration in forming this argument is Popper’s (1998, 1979, 
2010) argument that our understanding of material is not a phenomenon that can be located 
in the physical world. Instead, this understanding can only be interpreted through our 
perceptual and cognitive need to simplify and categorise human physiology, belief and 
behaviour. This need motivates philosophers to develop artificial categories through crude 
scientific classes and methodologies. As Popper states: 
It was first in animals and children, but later also in adults, that I observed the 
immensely powerful need for regularity - the need which makes them seek for 
regularities; which makes them sometimes experience regularities even where there 
are none. (Popper, 1979:pp.23-24) 
I argue these two influences help us understand how cross-modal transfer has been 
used by theorists to emphasise sightlessness in people with visual impairment. This 
philosophy has been used to develop a theory of material philosophy, link blindness to 
physical disability and damage rather than ability and adaptation. 
Consequently, philosophies have helped to reduce and classify blindness into an ethic 
of ability, inability, disability, handicap and impairment according to its most extreme, 
prototypical features. During the enlightenment, these philosophies were not just attempting 
to understand how humans consciously process the material world, they were also moral 
philosophies - these philosophies were trying to understand if morality was developed 
internally, or communicated as images of the outer world are. 
This study starts with a discussion on the nature and importance of cross-modal 
transfer. 
 
The Study of Cross-Modal Transfer 
In the modern era, two theories of multi-sensory learning have had particular 
significance on the methodology of learning theory and visual impairment: (1) what can be 
referred to as cross-modal linkage, in which different forms of sensory data – such as vision, 
sound, and touch - are processed together in the mind to form a single mental “image” (see 
for example, Driver & Spence, 2004); and (2) cross-modal transfer, in which sensory 
experiences associated with one sense can be understood through the stimulation of another 
sense (Gregory, 1974). 
Since the late twentieth century, the psychological theory of cross-modal transfer is 
recognised as having a significant effect on a general theory of human learning. For example, 
research on child development by Gottfried, Rose & Bridger (1977) discovered babies’ earliest 
experiences of touch and taste effect their later understanding of other forms of perception. 
There is also evidence that, despite an early reliance on touch and taste, adult 
humans’ visual data changes other sensory data when immediate sensory attention is 
needed. Spence (2010) refers to this as cross-modal attention. For instance, studies of the so-
called Colavita effect (Colavita, 1974; Spence, 2009), finds that the mind gives priority to visual 
information over auditory sensory data during events where auditory and visual data conflict 
– e.g. if a person’s mouth appears to visually mouth one word yet the voice says another, the 
mind will tend to hear the mouthed word. 
Similarly, studies of so-called cross-modal plasticity, where vision is removed and the 
mind has to rely on other sensory data, shows that sensory images can adapt to rely on other 
sensory data. For example, research with people who have significant visual impairments has 
shown that the what is called the visual cortex in the brain can be stimulated by touch (Sathian 
& Stilla, 2010) – this research subsequently questions whether the visual cortex is designed 
to process vision alone, as was traditionally thought. 
So how did this theory of cross-modal transfer come about? Moreover, how has its 
theory helped us to understand the learning of people with visual impairments? 
To answer these questions, it is vital to understand the historical context of this early 
period of the enlightenment. For instance, writers have observed the contemporary study of 
blindness and cross-modal transfer often refers to the Protestant English and Irish 
enlightenment (Gregory, 1974, 1987; Paulson, 1987; Jay, 1994; Hayhoe, 2003, 2015) - 
although Hayhoe (2015), Paulson (1987) and Jay (1994) also argue that similar political 
philosophies existed in the earlier period of French enlightenment, dating back to what is now 
referred to as the mind-body problem, or Cartesian-duality (Descartes, 1984). 
These writers observe that this philosophical revolution of thinking began with a 
question posed to the English legal and moral philosopher John Locke by the Irish natural 
philosopher William Molyneux. This question is reproduced below: 
Pour Les Auteurs de la Biblioteque 
Monsieur Waesberg 
March and Librair 
a 
Amsterdam 
Per Lond. 62 
6th July 88 
Dublin July 88 
A problem proposed to the author of the Essai Philosophique Consernant 
L’Enteneem 
A man being born blind and having a globe and a cube, nigh of the same 
bigness, committed into his hand, and being taught or told, which is called the 
globe and which the cube, so as easily to distinguish them by touch or feeling; 
then both things taken from him, and laid on a table. Let us suppose his sight 
restored to him; whether he could, by his sight, and before he touch them, know 
which is the globe and which the cube? So whether he could not reach them 
though they were removed 20 or 1000 feet from him? 
If the learned and ingenious author of this fore mentioned treatise think this 
problem worth his consideration and answer, he may at any time direct it to 
one, that much esteem him, and is, his humble servant, 
Will: Molyneux 
High Ormond’s Gate in Dublin, Ireland 
Letter from William Molyneux to John Locke, 7th July 1688. From the 
correspondence of John Locke, The John Locke Collection, Bodlean Library, Oxford 
University. 
Molyneux’s question was later reproduced in edited form under the heading On 
Perception, in the second edition of Locke’s (2001) Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
This second edition of the essay was published on Locke’s return to England after a period of 
political exile in France – the first edition was published in French in 1688, and the reference 
to the essay at the start of Molyneux’s letter refers to this original essay. 
At the time, this form of studying human perception remained untested by natural 
philosophers. In its range, however, this question did not simply address the narrow study of 
a relationship between touch and sight. This question was fundamental to understanding the 
perception and comprehension of a material consciousness separate to the external physical 
and moral world. 
However, the focus of this study was also not simply inspired by a material and 
cognitive understanding of perception, as Gregory (1974) later argued. Its origin was part of 
a more complex philosophy of mind, morality and metaphysics that questioned what was 
known in the human mind (Hayhoe, 2015). This philosophy was designed to challenge the 
conservative elements of the Anglican Church in England, and to undermine the theological 
dogmatism of the Roman Catholic Church. 
To understand the motivation for this challenge, it’s important to recognize the 
hypothetical discussion of blindness as philosophy of mind on sightlessness. In addition, it’s 
essential to understand the illustration of blindness in Molyneux’s original letter to Locke was 
only part of a discussion on the experience of blindness in Locke’s essay. 
Consequently, to fully understand the development of cross-modal transfer, I have 
divided the evolution of this theory into two classical periods of study in the field of cognition 
and blindness: the first period begins with John Locke’s first essay in 1688; the second begins 
with a renaissance of this philosophy by Richard Gregory in the 1950s. Both periods are 
essential for teaching us how the epistemology of cross-modal transfer and learning has 
philosophically evolved, and the mistakes that were made in our assumptions about blindness 
and learning. I argue that only through critically analysing the epistemology of these studies, 
can we begin to understand the true learning potential of people with visual impairments. 
 
Lockean Blindness in the Study of Philosophy 
John Locke courted political and religious controversy in the early 1680s, and began 
to encourage debate amongst more radical philosophies of this era. Although staying loyal to 
the broader cause of the Anglican Church, he formed a circle of philosophers with a similar 
aim, and philosophers who had influence on the drafting of his essay (Hayhoe, 2015). 
As Locke associated with politically dangerous political philosophies – religion and 
politics were entwined in this era - an order was made for his arrest and he was forced to 
leave England for Holland. A year later, Charles II also publicly expelled Locke from 
Christchurch College, Oxford, where Locke was a fellow. Thus, Locke’s philosophy of mind 
became politicised and his methodology of study became associated with the questioning of 
theological orthodoxy, power and government. 
Rather than dampening his influence, Locke’s arrest warrant encouraged his political 
and academic philosophies, and became a focal point for a political counter culture in 
England. Importantly, Locke also engaged in a secret theological dialogue with Isaac Newton, 
who also challenged the truth of vision, and more particularly the place of visions in the Bible 
(Hayhoe, 2015). 
In his essay, Locke used examples of non-sighted blindness in a number of passages 
beyond Molyneux’s question. In particular, rather than questioning this notion of blindness 
as inherent punishment of immorality, Locke argued morality was learnt after birth; i.e. 
inherited blindness was not a punishment for sin, as many orthodox and dogmatic theologies 
argued. 
For example, under the heading Further Considerations Concerning Innate Principles 
Both Speculative and Practical, Locke argued that the experience of all sensory modalities was 
learning. More importantly, in this chapter he identified memory as the foremost mode of 
understanding, rather than a more inward notion of inherent deliberation released through 
meditation. This inherent deliberation was previously held to be the key to human 
understanding. As he stated in his text: 
[A] blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the smallpox when he was a 
small child [had] no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask whether anyone 
can say this man had any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? 
And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any idea of colours at 
all … 
[The] truth is, ideas and notions are no more born in us than arts and sciences, though 
some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others and 
are therefore more generally received, though that too be according as the organs of 
our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed: God having fitted men 
with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, accordingly as they 
are employed. (Locke, 2001:pp.41–42). 
Eighteenth century philosophies on blindness and touch 
Early in the eighteenth century, the philosopher and Anglican bishop, George Berkley 
(1899) also offered an answer to Molyneux’s question. Like Locke, Berkley concluded that 
seeing was not an inherent, God-given function, and that what we call sight was learnt rather 
than inherent. What’s more, Berkeley argued that sensory experiences must be discrete, with 
vision being processed separately from sound and touch, and subsequently certain mental 
concepts could only be understood by sight. As he wrote on this answer: 
[A] man born blind, being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by sight; 
the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in 
his eye, or rather in his mind. (Berkeley, 1899:p.187) 
More importantly, however, in this era a possible empirical test to this solution was 
offered. Some fifteen years after Berkeley, the philosopher and surgeon William Cheselden 
(1839) developed a procedure for removing cataracts, allowing him to observe a boy born 
with no usable sight after surgery. Although prior to surgery the boy would have some 
understanding of light – he was said to be able to distinguish day from night - his vision was 
sufficiently impaired that he was unable to see objects through what light perception 
remained. What’s more, as sensory data from light was so abstracted in the boy’s mind, it 
could not provide a visual image, rendering colour patterns from objects vague and flat at 
best. 
Consequently, the boy’s relationship with physical objects before surgery was largely 
through holding and feeling them, and not usefully through understanding their shape 
visually. Similarly, the boy’s understanding of his environment was also through his non-visual 
senses, through physically moving through his environment or sensing his reflection of noise. 
Subsequently, the boy had no understanding of space through sight, as the light in his world 
was two-dimensional. 
After the boy’s eyes had sufficiently recovered from surgery, it soon became clear to 
Cheselden the boy could not understand the concept of distance or objects by sight alone. 
What’s more, when Cheselden showed the boy objects that were out of reach and that he’d 
previously held before surgery, the boy did not recognise them at first. It was only when the 
boy re-held the objects that he began to recognise them by what he assumed was by sight. 
However, following this early period of confusion Cheselden observed the boy could 
associate his experiences of handling objects to identifying the objects whilst seeing them 
alone. After a period of learning by sight what he had held by hand, the boy learnt to recognise 
many of these objects by sight alone, as if the boy was learning objects for the first time. 
Subsequently, Cheselden made the following observation: 
When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgement about distances that he 
thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed it) as what he felt did 
his skin … He knew not the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, no 
matter how different in shape or magnitude: but on being told what things were, 
whose form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe them that he 
might know them again; but having too many objects to learn at once he forgot many 
of them. (Cheselden, 1839:p.11) 
Following Berkeley and Cheselden, and using a method of intuitive observation, Denis 
Diderot’s (2001) Letter on the Blind for Those Who Can See promoted the intellectual equality 
of people with visual impairments. Significantly, Diderot’s philosophy was particularly 
important for its consequences on the development of schools for the blind later in the 
century, and the French politicisation of blindness (Paulson, 1987). Through Diderot, material 
philosophies also began to normalise touch as an ethically, emotionally and intellectually 
driven sensory modality. Furthermore, defying Roman Catholic orthodoxy, Diderot argued 
morality was developed internally, and morals were learnt without recourse to specific or 
finite senses. As Diderot observed on this issue: 
How different is the morality of the blind man from ours? And how different would 
that of a deaf man from his? And how to one with an extra sense, how deficient would 
our morality appear – to say nothing more? Our metaphysics and theirs agree no 
better. (Diderot, 2001:p.156). 
Like Locke’s earlier essay, Diderot’s letter also challenged the cultural power of the 
Roman Catholic church, by arguing visually impaired people become physically attached to 
the arts through touch and hearing. In making this argument, Diderot looked beyond simple 
intellectual classifications, and asserted touch was not simply perceptual, but could be a 
mode of social justice. 
However, in arguing for an equality of the senses, Diderot also did not believe the 
senses were equivalent, or that sensory data had cognitive parallels through other senses. 
Instead, Diderot believed that senses were naturally created to comprehend discrete forms 
of packaged sensory data, or the temporal difference between objects and the space that 
surrounded them. 
For example, Diderot argued that touch could be important for understanding a 
person’s very existence, as without tactile contact the world had a different sensory quality. 
What’s more, and unlike sight, without touch the nature of the world is not experienced as a 
sense of being connected to the earth, but as an abstract notion. Consequently, Diderot felt 
touch could be a more honest modality for understanding the true nature of our 
environment. 
Nurses help [babies] to acquire the notion of a continuance of absent persons by 
playing a game which consists in hiding the face, and showing it again. Thus, they learn 
a hundred times in a quarter of an hour that what ceases to appear does not 
necessarily cease to exist. From this it follows that we owe the notion of the continuous 
existence of objects to experience, of their distance to the sense of touch; that it would 
be surprising should the aid of one of the senses be necessary to another; and that 
touch, which ascertains the existence of objects exterior to ourselves when present to 
our eyes, is similarly the sense to which the confirmation not only of these figures, and 
other details of these objects, but even their presence is reserved. (Diderot, 
2001:p.181) 
However, despite promoting social justice for people with visual impairments, Paulson 
(1987) later argued Diderot seemed to create a new form of romanticised mythology about 
blindness. Furthermore, Paulson observed that in his letter Diderot went as far as to suggest 
sightlessness could be advantageous to the human minds understanding of the outer world. 
This claim later inspired French writers in the nineteenth century to elevate fictitious blind 
characters to an almost fabled status. 
Undeniably, this philosophy was not unique, and similar mythologies existed from 
antiquity, with a belief in sightless inner-vision in ancient Greece in particular (Barasch, 2001). 
However, Diderot’s material philosophy differed as it further separated the development of 
consciousness through perception from a belief in the direct interference of God. As a 
consequence, and as Jay (1994) argued, it is without doubt that Diderot’s essay was 
epistemologically important, as it became the seedbed for general philosophies of both 
material and language. 
Diderot’s first argument concerned the value of touch, which he claimed was as potent 
a source of knowledge as vision. One recent French commentator, Elizabeth de 
Fontenay, has gone so far as to say that in the Letter ‘The great victor in this carnival 
of the senses established on the ruins of the castle of the eye and consciousness is 
touch’ … 
For a materialist like Diderot, the dethroning of vision was especially appealing, for 
although he sarcastically calls idealism ‘an extravagant system which should to my 
thinking have been the offspring of blindness itself,’ he recognised the tendential 
linkage between privileging ideas in the mind and the putative superiority of vision. 
(Jay, 1994:p.100-101) 
Early philosophies of cross-modal transfer also inspired the first published proposal 
for the education of people with visual impairment in the style of Diderot’s letter. This 
proposal was published in an open letter in 1774 by Thomas Blacklock, a Presbyterian 
Minister and philosopher who was later to create Edinburgh’s Asylum for the Blind – for the 
purposes of his letter, Blacklock wrote under the pseudonym Demodocus, a blind bard in 
Homer’s Odyssey, who was deprived of sight by the Muses, the ancient Greek goddesses 
(Hayhoe, 2015). 
Blacklock was born in the rural county of Dumfries & Galloway, and died in Edinburgh 
in 1791, obtained a doctorate from Marischal College, Aberdeen, and preached in Edinburgh. 
Blacklock’s letter was published in a well-known political journal from the enlightenment, the 
Edinburgh Magazine and Review (Demodocus, 1774). Blacklock himself was blinded at the 
age of six-months from smallpox, and he referred to his blindness at several points in this 
letter.  
In his letter, Demodocus cited the cross-modal use of touch as a substitute for vision, 
and to promote an academic, musical and vocational education and a liberal pedagogy. As 
with Diderot, the aim of Demodocus’ letter was to develop an ethical treatment of a blind 
social underclass that was often found begging in the major cities of Europe. Drawing from 
moral philosophy, Demodocus also saw the cause of the population of people with visual 
impairments as overtly political, and one which effected religious belief. 
The data which they explore may be presented in such a manner, as to render 
discoveries easier; but still let invention be allowed to co-operate. The internal triumph 
and exultation which the mind feels free from the attainment and conviction of new 
truths, heightens their charms, impresses them deep on the memory, and gives them 
an influence in practice, which they could not otherwise have boasted. (Demodocus, 
1774:p.680) 
In his letter Demodocus also gave examples of successful people with visual 
impairments in the aristocracy, commerce, government, and academia. Most notable 
amongst these examples was Nicholas Sanderson - Sanderson, a protégé of Isaac Newton, 
was a recent Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge University, and invented a 
system of mathematical pin-prick language. 
However, despite his belief in the academic ability of people with visual impairments, 
Demodocus still saw total blindness – his own form of blindness - as a form of moral disability. 
Consequently, and like his colleague Hume (1749), Demodocus stressed the person who lived 
“in darkness” still felt threatened in daily life, and struggled to overcome a moral dread. 
Those philosophers who have attempted to break the alliance between darkness and 
spectres, were certainly inspired by laudable motives. But they must give us leave to 
assert there is a natural and essential connection between night and oreus. Were we 
endowed with senses to advertise us of every noxious object before its congruity could 
render it formidable, our panics would probably be less frequent and sensible than we 
really feel them. Darkness and silence therefore have something dreadful in them, 
because they supersede the vigilance of those senses which give us the earliest notices 
of things. (Demodocus, 1774:p.679) 
 
Contemporary replications of Cheselden’s study 
Although empirically moving on from the political and religious enlightenment of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, contemporary philosophies of blindness replicated 
earlier methods and categorisation. The most widely cited of these studies began in the late 
1950s, when Richard Gregory and his research assistant Jean Wallace re-problematized 
Molyneux’s question (Gregory, 1974) – although previous studies, such as one by the 
phenomenologist von Senden, had tested Molyneux’s questions, Gregory & Wallace were the 
first to use a method much like that of Cheselden. As with Cheselden’s case study, Gregory & 
Wallace studied a fifty-two-year-old man, SB, who had recently been successfully treated for 
congenital cataracts and had no previously usable vision. 
Drawing on Cheselden’s method, Gregory & Wallace observed SB’s experiences in the 
period immediately after his eyes physically recovered, seeing SB’s response to his 
environment. Furthermore, Gregory & Wallace contrived situations in which SB could be 
presented with structured, empirical tasks including: visits to museums and city centres to 
gauge SB’s recognition of objects; drawing familiar objects when he had never tried this art 
before; and the recognition of objects he’d previously felt when he was visually impaired. 
Subsequently, Gregory & Wallace were the first to describe the observations that transpired 
as cross-modal transfer. 
Gregory & Wallace’s observations and tests were recorded qualitatively, with the 
remainder of their data coming from health and school records provided by SB. For example, 
in Gregory & Wallace’s later publication of the case study, it was said: “[SB] found that when 
looking down from a high window (about 30-40 feet above the ground) he thought that he 
could safely lower himself down by his hands.” (Gregory, 1974:p.101) 
Many of Cheselden’s original observations were replicated in SB’s case study, with 
Gregory & Wallace finding that SB could appreciate objects aesthetically by sight – casting 
doubt on previous phenomenological studies by the likes of Revesz (1950) and von Senden 
(1932), which favoured Hume’s philosophy that sensory information had discrete values 
(Hayhoe, 2015). Subsequently, in their concluding remarks Gregory & Wallace argued of 
Berkley’s boy and of SB: 
One may even say that their attempt to see was made long before their eyes were 
opened to the light, and in this respect they differ not only from most other cases in 
the literature but also of course from infants. (Gregory, 1989:p.117)  
However, despite SB’s ability to become used to his environment through sight, 
Gregory & Wallace also observed the emotional problems that this transition caused. This 
difficulty appeared to illustrate not only a psychological difference of cognition, but also a 
cultural difference between a largely sighted and a largely tactile world that SB never 
reconciled. 
For example, Gregory & Wallace observed SB became depressed because of this 
transition. Although this depression was at its strongest just after his operation, it lingered far 
longer than was healthy – this depression was a new phenomenon, something that had not 
been reported before SB’s surgery. After keeping in touch with him after he left hospital, 
Gregory & Wallace also found SB tried to recreate a non-visual world in private, often sitting 
at home in darkened rooms. In the long term, he never seemed comfortable or happy with 
his new visual world, and died not long after Gregory & Wallace’s contact finished. 
Understandably, Gregory & Wallace found SB’s death disturbing, particularly after becoming 
close to him during their study, and Gregory subsequently recorded the following in his diary: 
On 2 August 1960, S.B. died. 
His story is in some ways tragic. He suffered one of the greatest handicaps (sic.), and 
yet he lived with energy and enthusiasm. When his handicap was apparently swept 
away, as by a miracle, he lost his peace and his self-respect. 
We may feel disappointment at a private dream come true: S.B. found disappointment 
with what he took to be reality. (Gregory, 1974:p.114) 
Later in the twentieth century, Gregory’s observations were replicated by Oliver Sacks 
(1995) in his study of a middle-aged person recovering from surgery to gain sight for the first 
time. Sacks began this study after he was approached by the family of a fifty-year-old man, to 
whom he gave the pseudonym Virgil. Sacks described Virgil as someone: 
who had been virtually blind since early childhood. He had thick cataracts, and was 
said also to have retinitis pigmentosa, a hereditary condition that slowly but 
implacably eats away at the retinas. (Sacks, 1995:p.63) 
In his study, Sacks borrowed from Gregory’s methodology, going as far as to consult 
Gregory about his and Wallace’s work with SB. Subsequently, Sacks collected educational and 
medical records from Virgil, observed Virgil not long after his surgery and conducted tests on 
his ability to recognise objects by sight. In addition, Sacks had a significant extra advantage, 
as he was also given permission to refer to the diaries of Virgil’s sister, collected from 
childhood to the time of the study. 
As a physician himself, Sacks observed Virgil’s medical records provided little usable 
or objective results, and so largely these documents remained unused in his analysis. Instead, 
Sacks found Gregory’s methodology of observation and structured tasks more useful, and 
discussed qualitative data, constructing a narrative case study. 
On publishing his results, Sacks found many similarities with Cheselden’s and Gregory 
& Wallace’s observations, and cast further doubt on the phenomenological studies criticised 
by Gregory & Wallace. The most notable similarity with SB was that even after his eyes 
recovered from surgery, Virgil would still rely on touch to familiarise himself with objects. For 
example, after their first meeting at the airport, Sacks observed “[Virgil pointed] to all of the 
cars we passed ... ‘Look at that one’ he exclaimed once. ‘I have to look down!’ and bending 
felt it.” (Sacks, 1995:p.66) 
Furthermore, Sacks also found Gregory & Wallace’s earlier observation that a 
transition from blindness to sightedness could disrupt Virgil’s mental health. For example, 
Sacks found that during his study Virgil became depressed and would often recreate his 
earlier blindness at home, switching off lights and sitting in a darkened room. However, in a 
paradoxical change of fortune, and following further illness, Virgil lost his sight for a second 
time shortly afterwards, an event which improved his mental health. As Sacks noted in his 
case study: 
[Now] a final blindness - a blindness he received as a gift. Now, at last, Virgil is allowed 
to see, allowed to escape from the glaring and confusing world of sight and space, and 
to return to his own being, the touch world that has been his home for almost fifty 
years. (Sacks, 1995:p.73) 
Material philosophies after Gregory & Wallace 
In the latter years of the twentieth century, the philosophy of blindness had a 
renaissance and material philosophers found themselves inspired by the epistemology of 
enlightenment. Importantly, like Gregory & Wallace, material philosophers in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries also attempted to replicate the methodology and classification of 
moral philosophies. 
For instance, as Rene Descartes (1984) used the analogue of a cat to represent 
superior vision, Thomas Nagel (1991) used the analogue of a bat to represent experiences of 
sightlessness. And like Descartes, Nagel’s aim in doing so was to show the subjectivity of the 
experience of sightlessness, arguing it provided a unique experience of objects and the 
environment. 
Drawing on Hume’s (1749) theory of the colour red, Nagel’s philosophy was in 
common with Diderot’s (2001) belief that the senses were equal but discrete. Consequently, 
Nagel theorised visual concepts such as colour could only be understood through direct 
experiences of seeing colour; the only exception being when light and dark shades of the 
same colour are seen, and the mind can imagine the individual shade in between. 
However, and unlike Hume and Diderot, Nagel argued there were two types of 
understanding: objective and subjective sensory concepts. Subjective understanding, Nagel 
argued, could only be understood through direct experience, whereas objective 
understanding could only be communicated through language. 
More particularly, Nagel observed that language cannot be used as an analogue for 
subjective experiences, which cannot be imagined as others see them, finding sensory 
analogies with synthesisia – where a colour is heard or smelt, rather than seen - were miss-
appropriated. What’s more, Nagel argued that using language with direct links to a visual 
vocabulary – such as describing bread as ‘looking warm’ or sky that ‘looks cold’ – with people 
who are born blind cannot lead to subjective understanding. 
For Nagel, if a person never saw they would never be able to understand a sense they 
had never experienced, even when vision was presented as an analogy. Thus, Nagel argued, 
blindness is a subjective deficiency in a sighted world, but not an objective one. Therefore, 
cross-modal thinking can only be based on direct experiences of phenomena, and language 
or symbolic knowledge merely elucidates objective visual concepts – i.e. experiences render 
these concepts understandable only by their subjective and direct experience. 
One might try … to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind 
from birth what it was like to see. One would reach a blank wall eventually, but it 
should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms much more than 
we can at present, and with much greater precision. The loose inter-modal analogies 
– for example, ‘Red is like the sound of a trumpet’ – which crop up in discussions of this 
subject are of little use. That should be clear to anyone who has both heard a trumpet 
and seen red. But structural features of perception might be more accessible to 
objective description, even though something would be left out. And concepts 
alternative to those we learn in the first person may enable us to arrive at a kind of 
understanding even of our own experience which is denied us by the very ease of our 
description and lack of distance that subjective concepts afford.” (Nagel, 1991:p.179) 
Taking inspiration from the correspondence of philosophers such as Locke and 
Molyneux, Bryan Magee & Martin Milligan (1998) formed contrasting opinions on cross-
modal transfer. Milligan, who was himself visually impaired and campaigned for the rights of 
visually impaired people, argued his own experiences through touch provided a unique view 
on the world. Like Diderot, Milligan felt these experiences, although different, were no less 
morally or intellectually deficient than those of people with sight. 
Conversely, and similar to Nagel and Hume, Magee argued that lacking sight also led 
to a deficit of subjective experience, of semantics of language and of an understanding of 
visual imagination. What’s more, Magee argued blindness could not allow Milligan to 
comprehend the experiences of sighted people. Instead, Magee argued Milligan’s experience 
of the world was segmented and uncontinuous, as Milligan could only touch a single object 
at a time. For instance, Magee observed, Milligan could not conceptualise visual concepts 
requiring distance beyond his reach. 
Although similar to Diderot in agreeing touch was segmented, Milligan felt sight could 
be dishonest, describing it as a hungry sense, which must experience everything all the time. 
Consequently, Milligan suggested, people with vision needed to see aesthetically and greedily 
whilst they were awoken, and rarely distinguished between experiences and aesthetics. 
Contrariwise, touch was selective, and therefore took time to carefully discriminate between 
different sensory experiences. Touch is subsequently less greedy, and more of a gourmand of 
the aesthetics and the world it encounters. As Milligan argued: 
By the sighted, seeing is felt as a need. And it is the feeding of this almost ungovernable 
craving that constitutes the ongoing pleasure of sight. It is as if we were desperately 
hungry all the time, in such a way that only if we were eating all the time could we be 
content – so we eat all the time. 
Because the realization seems to be lacking, your conception of the pleasures of sight 
appears altogether too aesthetic, as if someone were to suppose that the only 
pleasures involved in eating and drinking were those of the gourmet. There are, of 
course, aesthetic visual pleasures, but for most of us these are associated with rare or 
special occasions – looking at a painting or a landscape, seeing a beautiful woman, 
going to the ballet. Not many of us are lucky to see beautiful objects every day, 
whereas the normal pleasures of seeing, which is some sort of hungered-for and deeply 
needed satisfyingness, accompanies us all the time we are awake. (Magee & Milligan, 
1998:p.135) 
In common with Nagel and Magee, Robert Hopkins (2000, 2003) argued that people 
who are sighted differ from people who are blind quantitatively, as they had superior sensory 
experiences. Through a review of studies on the comprehension of tactile pictures by people 
with visual impairments, Hopkins hypothesised distance and perspective have different 
qualities to those without sight. 
Therefore, people with sight have an advantage when touching objects’ features that 
are associated with vision, such as foreshortening in tactile pictures – the concept of far-away 
objects feeling smaller than those in the foreground. Their experience of vision, Hopkins 
argued, allows people without visual impairments to experience touch through their visual 
experience as well as their tactile sensation. 
Consequently, Hopkins argued, sculpture is the only exceptional art form for people 
who have no sight and no visual experience. Sculpture, he continued, simulated space more 
completely than a tactile picture could, as it did not involve metaphors or visual symbolism. 
Sculpture was a unique form of art, which lent itself to further interpretation beyond that of 
mere sightedness. Where pictures were created primarily for vision, sculpture was a more 
democratic reproduction of the real world, lending itself to little interpretation. 
[Sculpture] is able to straddle the divide between the represented and representing, as 
painting does not, precisely because it does not incorporate a perspective on what it 
represents. … [Sculpture’s] fundamental source is our awareness of our own 
possibilities for movement and action. That awareness is not something we derive 
from any particular sense, so much as something which informs experience in every 
sense modality. Thus, in offering us the form of engagement [Suzanne] Langer 
describes, sculpture is neither visual, nor tactile, but a complex mixture of the sensory, 
as standardly conceived, with our awareness of our own bodies, and their possible 
interactions with the world. (Hopkins, 2003:pp.25-26) 
 
Discussion 
In the introduction to this chapter, I asked the following question: Has the 
methodology of cross-modal transfer effected our theory of cognition and blindness to the 
detriment of the majority of people with visual impairments? 
I would argue that it has. 
The methodologies of early philosophical studies of cross-modal transfer mostly 
lacked imagination in developing an epistemology of blindness, or in promoting the social 
inclusion of people with visual impairments. Instead, the categorisation and ontology of cross-
modal transfer was conflated with moral philosophy, and used enlightened thinking as a tool 
to challenge orthodox religion and political power. 
Importantly, Molyneux’s question was not asked in isolation. Neither was this 
question the only instance of a consideration of blindness by Locke or his circle of 
philosophers; nor was it the only use of a methodology that can be referred to as political 
blindness by the philosophers that followed Locke in the eighteenth century. Importantly, the 
methodological assumption that experiences of blindness were wholly sightless was repeated 
elsewhere in Locke’s essay, and discussed and examined more than other perceptual 
impairments as an example of ignorance. Consequently, the motivation for a so-called 
enlightened study of blindness was in part to show a lack of an inherited visual ability alone 
as evidence of internal morality. 
The biased and ill-conceived methodologies of enlightened philosophies were to have 
consequences for later material philosophies of blindness. Following the enlightenment, 
material philosophies repeated the miss-categorisation of people as either sighted or 
sightless. Subsequently, the use of blindness and touch as a symbol of philosophy and equality 
also elevated people without sight to case studies of visual impairment, rather than as 
exceptions to the norm. This use of cross-modal transfer also made the plight of the wholly 
sightless infamous, and an object of moral fascination, singling such people out as examples 
of inequality. 
Consequently, enlightened philosophies of cross-modal transfer and non-visual 
perception were not based on the practical logic of supporting or teaching people with visual 
impairments. What’s more, their understanding of non-visual perception was often 
concentrated on developing a belief that non-visual perception could only partially make up 
for vision loss – even Diderot and Blacklock believed touch had a different cognitive as well 
as perceptual quality. 
This categorisation of blindness thus brought prejudice as much as it developed useful 
knowledge. Subsequently, in the twentieth century although through observations Gregory 
and Sacks empirically illustrated learned perceptions, they also repeated the stereotype of 
blindness as sightlessness. This belief was yet again repeated by the material philosophies of 
Nagel, Magee & Milligan, and Hopkins. 
Consequently, educators who are influenced by these studies develop their own 
theories in the belief that touch is a primary mode of learning (Hayhoe, 2015). This largely 
explains why institutions for the blind have focused on handwork, touch, vibration and audible 
communication in the past - these were often the only medium of communication, 
imagination and vocation for over two hundred years. These philosophies of cross-modal 
transfer also had the inadvertent effect of producing reductionist and biased ideas about 
blindness in the development of touch languages and technologies. 
For instance, the use of such symbols as Braille labelling and literature have come to 
be seen as inclusion for people who are blind. However, this stereotyping of people who are 
visually impaired serves them badly, as it is estimated that the majority of people with visual 
impairments have little need or want for Braille - for instance, in 2012 it was found that the 
great majority of British people registered blind do not read Braille, and rely on audio books 
or digital readers either to speak or enlarge text (RNIB, 2012; Creaser & Spacey, 2012). 
Subsequently, this sole reliance on Braille in traditional education, buildings and 
reading materials produced for people with visual impairments has promoted passive 
exclusion (Hayhoe, 2015, 2016). What’s more, this reliance on touch in colleges and the 
workplace has also restricted life-chances and often led people with visual impairments to 
believe they are incapable of vocational, intellectual or artistic activities (see for example, 
Hayhoe, 2008, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
It’s undeniable the philosophies discussed in this chapter provided a body of theory 
on perception that was testable through empiricism, and these philosophies have motivated 
inclusion in education. Without cross-modal transfer, children with visual impairments would 
not have received an education, strategies of teaching would not be unconsidered important, 
and building accessibility and accessible technologies would not have developed. As 
importantly, these theories also provide us with a discourse for informed debate on inclusion 
and disability. Philosophies from the enlightenment in particular have given us our 
contemporary moral values of social justice and equality, and raised such moral issues in the 
public consciousness. 
However, the original philosophies of the enlightenment were not just trying to raise 
the status of people with visual impairments they were also trying to create a general moral 
and political philosophy. Consequently, it suited these philosophers to categorise people with 
visual impairments as a sightless population rather than a population with restricted sight. 
This problem has improved little in the modern era: whereas the understanding of 
these philosophies evolved significantly, and our understanding of human capacity has 
improved through a critical evaluation of previous generations of philosophy, methods have 
evolved little. Subsequently, modern material philosophies – and psychologies – of blindness 
still focus on blindness as sightlessness, and see the support of people with visual impairment 
as largely being premised on touch. This has hampered the progress of inclusion and the 
pedagogical strategies we need to teach people with visual impairments alongside people 
with full sight. 
Consequently, a potential solution to this problem is two-fold. Firstly, philosophy, 
particularly philosophies that inform cognitive studies of blindness, need an updated 
methodology. This methodology needs to see the ontology of people with visual impairments 
as a spectrum of needs based on different forms of perception, as well as different social and 
broader cultural needs. Secondly, philosophers should only consider creating philosophies of 
blindness if their aim is to promote the inclusion and understanding of blindness itself, and 
not make broader points about the mind. It’s only when people with visual impairments are 
not regarded as this separate perceptual species will blindness be seen largely as a human 
issue rather than a cognitive novelty and deficit. 
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